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Retirement Trends and Policies




Joseph F. Quinn 
Boston College
The United States and other industrial nations face key challenges 
associated with a graying population. Depressed birth rates and rising 
longevity have increased the dependency ratio throughout the industri 
alized world. Population projections of the Social Security Trustees 
suggest the U.S. aged-dependency ratio the ratio of Americans older 
than 64 to Americans aged 20 to 64—will increase almost 70 percent 
between 2000 and 2030. The increase will be even larger in some 
other rich countries. As the U.S. population grows older, the cost of 
paying for pension and health benefits must rise, boosting tax burdens 
and impairing the nation's ability to pay for other government obliga 
tions. The burden imposed by an aging population would rise more 
gradually if workers could be persuaded to delay their retirements and 
continue contributing to the health and pension systems.
In this chapter, we consider long-term trends in retirement, as well 
as recent trends that signal at least a pause in the historical pattern of 
earlier withdrawal from the workforce. We also discuss public policies 
that might reinforce the very recent trend toward greater labor force 
participation among older workers.
RETIREMENT TRENDS
At the beginning of the last century, retirement was relatively 
uncommon but not unknown. Two out of three American men past age 
65 were employed, but one-third were not (U.S. Department of Com 
merce 1975, p. 132).' By middle of the twentieth century, retirement
375
376 Burtless and Quinn
was far more common. Fewer than half of men 65 and older held a job 
in 1950. By 1985, the proportion at work fell still further. Just 16 per 
cent of men over 65 were employed or actively seeking a job; 84 per 
cent were outside the active labor force. The percentage of women 
past 65 who were employed or looking for work also shrank during the 
first four decades after World War II, though this was mainly because 
the average age of women past 65 was rising. The reduction in 
women's employment was far smaller than among men in part because 
the percentage of older women who worked outside the home was 
quite low in the 1940s.
The decline in labor force participation at older ages has not been 
confined to the United States. It is characteristic of all rich industrial 
ized countries. In most European countries, employment rates among 
the elderly are now significantly below those in the United States 
(Quinn and Burkhauser 1994). Along with a shrinking work week and 
rising paid employment among married women, earlier retirement 
among men has been a distinctive feature of economic progress in all 
the developed countries.
Trends in the United States
The pattern of declining work among older men is clearly evident 
in Figure 1. Each line in the figure traces the labor force participation 
rate of older American men, by age, in a different year of the past cen 
tury.2 (A person is considered to be a labor force participant if he or 
she holds a job or is actively seeking work.) The top line shows age- 
specific participation rates of older men in 1910. Note that there is a 
clear pattern of labor market withdrawal with advancing age. Even at 
age 72, however, the male participation rate in 1910 was over 50 per 
cent. Participation rates in 1940, 1970,1984-1985, and 1998-1999 are 
displayed in the lower four lines. Each of these lines shows a charac 
teristic pattern of labor market withdrawal as men grow older. The cru 
cial difference between 1910 and later years is that the fall-off in labor 
force participation begins at an earlier age and proceeds at a faster 
pace.
The decline in male participation was neither smooth nor uniform 
over the century. By far the largest proportionate declines in participa-
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tion occurred among men past the age of 65. In 1998-1999, for exam 
ple, the participation rate among 72-year-olds was only one-quarter of 
the equivalent rate in 1910. The fall-off in participation was smaller at 
younger ages. In general, large declines in participation occurred in 
the early and middle parts of the century for the oldest age groups; 
major declines occurred after 1960 among younger men. The largest 
percentage declines among men older than 70 occurred between 1910 
and 1940. The fastest declines among 65- to 69-year-olds took place 
between 1940 and 1970. The biggest declines among men under 65 
did not occur until after 1960, after the earliest age of eligibility for 
Social Security benefits was reduced to 62. A striking feature of Figure 
1 is that there has been no decline in older men's participation rates 
since the mid 1980s. After a long period of decline, the participation 
rates of older men stabilized or even increased slightly after 1985.
The story for older American women is different. Older women's 
participation rates in the post-World War II era have reflected two par 
tially offsetting phenomena: the early retirement trend of older workers
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in general and the increasing labor force participation of married 
women. As a result of the latter, the participation rates of older women 
did not exhibit the dramatic postwar declines seen among men. 
Instead, as shown in lower panel of Table 1, age-specific labor force 
participation rates generally increased among women. Between 1950 
and 1998-1999, the female participation rate rose 39 percentage points 
at age 55, 26 points at age 60, 8 points at age 65, and 7 points at age 70. 
What is similar to the male experience is the shift in trends after 
1985. As with men, there is a noticeable break from the earlier trend in 
older women's labor force participation. Between 1970 and 1985, 
older women's labor force participation rate barely increased at all, and 
it even declined among people past age 62. In contrast, female partici 
pation rates surged in the 15 years after 1985. Figure 2 shows the 
annual percentage-point change in participation at selected ages in the
Table 1 Labor Force Participation Rates at Selected Ages by Sex, 
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Figure 2 Annual Change in Labor Force Participation Rate at Selected 
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two different periods. The top panel shows trends in the participation 
rate of older men, and the lower panel shows trends at the same five 
ages for women. At age 62, the male participation rate fell 1.5 percent 
age points a year from 1970 to 1985. The rate among 62-year-old 
women declined 0.2 points a year over the same period. Between 1985 
and 1999, the male participation rate at age 62 rose 0.3 percentage 
points per year; the female rate increased 0.7 points per year. At each 
age, the rate of increase in participation rates accelerated, the rate of 
decline in participation rates shrank, or a decline in participation rates 
was reversed. The similarity of the break points in the male and female 
time series is striking (Quinn 1999b). Women's participation rates at 
older ages have risen strongly over the past 15 years, while among 
older men, the long-term decline in participation rates has ended and 
may even have reversed.
Historical information about participation rates can be used to 
trace out the long-term trend in retirement. Figure 3 shows the trend in 
the "average" male retirement age if we define that age as the youngest
Figure 3 Average Retirement Age of American Men, 1910-1999
60
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Year
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of data in Ransom, Sutch, and Wllliamson (1991) and 
Munnell (1977) and in March Current Population Survey files for 1963-1999.
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age at which fewer than half the men in the age group remain in the 
workforce. Under this definition, the average male retirement age fell 
from 74 years in 1910 to 63 years in 1998-1999, a drop of about 1.2 
years per decade. The tabulations in Figure 3 also indicate, however, 
that the trend toward earlier male retirement has recently slowed and 
may even have ceased.
The decline in the average retirement age has occurred in an envi 
ronment of rising life expectancy among older Americans, especially in 
the period since 1940. Falling mortality rates among the elderly added 
almost four years to the expected life span of a 65-year-old man and 
more than 5.5 years to the life expectancy of a 65-year-old woman after 
1940. Since expected male life spans increased about 0.8 years per 
decade during a period in which the retirement age dropped 1.2 years 
per decade, the amount of the male life span devoted to retirement 
climbed about 2 years per decade, adding almost 12 years to the 
amount of time men spend in retirement. Retirement now represents a 
substantial fraction of a typical worker's life. For many workers, 
retirement will last longer than the period from birth until full-time 
entry into the job market.
Trends in Other Rich Countries
The long-term trend toward earlier retirement in the United States 
has been matched and usually surpassed by equivalent trends in 
other rich countries. In a recent survey of the determinants of retire 
ment in rich countries, OECD economists produced estimates of the 
average retirement age in 24 high-income nations (Blbndal and Scar- 
petta 1998). They estimated the average age at which men and women 
withdrew from the active workforce for selected years between 1950 
and 1995. Their estimates show that the average retirement age has 
declined in nearly all of the countries since 1950. In 1950, the average 
retirement age for men was 65 or higher in almost all the 24 countries. 
By 1995, the male retirement age had fallen everywhere except Ice 
land. In most countries, the drop in the average retirement age was at 
least three years. In a quarter of the countries, an average male now 
leaves the workforce before attaining age 60. The drop in the average 
retirement age of women has been even faster.
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As one of the richest OECD countries, the United States might be 
expected to have one of the lowest retirement ages. Instead, it has one 
of the highest. In 1950, its average retirement age placed the United 
States in the middle of the 24 countries surveyed by the OECD. By 
1995, it had one of the oldest retirement ages. Only four out of the 24 
countries had a higher male retirement age (Iceland, Japan, Norway, 
and Switzerland) and only five had a higher female retirement age (Ice 
land, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey). Figure 4 shows the 1960- 
1995 trend in average retirement ages in the seven largest OECD econ 
omies, separately for men and women. In all seven countries, women 
retire at a younger age than men. (The male/female gap in retirement 
ages averaged 2.5 years in 1995.) In all seven countries, the average 
retirement age of both men and women has fallen over time; but, the 
decline has been smaller in the United States, and especially in Japan, 
than in the other five countries.
Some of the recent divergence in retirement trends is due to differ 
ences in the state of the overall job market. The United States and 
Japan maintained much lower unemployment rates than the other five 
countries through most of the 1990s. The tighter labor markets in those 
two countries probably encouraged older workers to remain employed 
longer than they would have if the unemployment rate approached 
European levels. It is also likely, however, that cross-country differ 
ences in old-age and disability pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
health insurance coverage played important roles in keeping older 
American and Japanese workers in the labor force (Gruber and Wise 
1999).
The retirement-age trends displayed in Figure 4 obviously have 
different implications for a nation depending on whether its working- 
age population is growing or shrinking. The extra burden implied by 
an earlier retirement age is easier to bear if the working-age population 
is expanding rapidly, either as a result of natural population increase or 
immigration. In this respect, Canada and the United States enjoy a sig 
nificant advantage over the other five countries. High immigration and 
moderate fertility rates ensure substantial labor force growth in North 
America over the next few decades, even if U.S. and Canadian retire 
ment ages should continue to fall. Germany, Italy, and Japan face 
much less favorable prospects; fertility in all three countries is 
extremely low, and immigration into Japan is negligible. The three
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Figure 4 Estimates of the Average Age of Transition out of Active 
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countries face a future in which their active working populations will 
decline, even if the average retirement age remains unchanged (Bos- 
worth and Burtless 1998). If the average age at retirement continues to 
decline, these countries will face even heavier burdens in supporting 
their growing elderly populations.
EXPLAINING THE TRENDS
Research by economists and others has shed valuable light on the 
evolution of retirement in the United States. Most of the early research 
on American retirement trends was conducted by analysts in the Social 
Security Administration using survey information from retired workers 
receiving Social Security benefits or workers who had recently retired 
(Quinn et al. 1990, pp. 43-53; Quinn 1991, pp. 119-123). In the earli 
est surveys of new retirees, an overwhelming majority of male respon 
dents said they retired because they were laid off by their last employer 
or were in such poor health that further work was unappealing or 
impossible. In the 1940s and early 1950s, fewer than 5 percent of new 
retirees reported leaving work because of a wish to retire or enjoy more 
leisure; about 90 percent left because of poor health or a layoff. These 
explanations for retirement dominated survey responses and the 
research literature from the 1940s through the early 1970s. Only a 
very small percentage of retired men reported leaving work because 
they wanted to retire. An early analyst suggested that "most old people 
work as long as they can and retire only because they are forced to do 
so ... [O]nly a small proportion of old people leave the labor market 
for good unless they have to" (Quinn 1991, p. 120).
In recent surveys of new Social Security beneficiaries, a larger per 
centage of pensioners reports leaving work because of a desire to enjoy 
additional leisure or to retire. By the early 1980s, the desire to leave 
work explained nearly half of all retirements among men 65 or older, 
while poor health accounted for only a little over 20 percent and invol 
untary layoff about 15 percent of retirements. The proportion of work 
ers who say they have retired for purely voluntary reasons is plainly on 
the increase.
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Many people will accept these responses at face value, but there 
are reasons to be skeptical of the story they tell. From 1940 through 
the early 1970s, well over a third of respondents explained their entry 
into retirement as the result of involuntary job loss. While this expla 
nation might seem plausible, labor economists recognize that millions 
of workers lose their jobs each year without choosing to retire. The 
overwhelming majority of workers who state that job loss was the rea 
son for their retirement lost several jobs earlier in their careers, but on 
no previous occasion did their layoffs cause them to permanently exit 
the labor force. When forced into unemployment at younger ages, 
these same workers looked for another job and eventually found one. 
It is natural to ask why job loss pushed them into retirement on this one 
occasion but not on the others.
Even the explanation of "poor health" should be treated with cau 
tion. Social Security beneficiaries may account for their retirement 
with the explanation that bad health left them no alternative, but it 
seems reasonable to ask whether their decision to retire would have 
been different if Social Security or other pensions were unavailable. In 
the early postwar era, some retirees may have explained their employ 
ment status in terms of job loss or bad health because the desire for 
more leisure was not yet considered an acceptable reason to be without 
a job. As retirement has come to be considered a normal and even 
desirable part of life, workers may feel less reason to describe their job- 
lessness as involuntary.
Wealth, Health, and the Physical Demands of Work
However we interpret the survey responses of people who collect 
pensions, it should be plain the long-term trend toward earlier male 
retirement has had an important voluntary component. The trend in 
survey responses suggests this is true, and a growing body of research 
evidence also supports the conclusion. The simplest and probably 
most powerful explanation for earlier retirement is rising wealth. The 
United States and other industrialized countries have grown richer over 
time. Real per capita GDP in the United States has more than doubled 
since 1960, increasing about 2 percent a year. Some of this increased 
wealth has been used to purchase more leisure. Americans stay in
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school longer than they once did, enter the workforce later, work fewer 
hours per year, and leave the labor force earlier.
For many of today's retired workers, the increases in wealth flow 
ing from greater national prosperity have been augmented by windfall 
gains from two sources: higher prices for the houses they own and gen 
erous benefits from Social Security and Medicare. Because the Social 
Security system has historically been very generous, most generations 
retiring up to the present have received larger pensions than their con 
tributions alone could have paid for if the contributions had been 
invested in safe assets. Workers who retired under Social Security 
before the mid 1980s received pensions well in excess of the benefits 
they would have received if Social Security offered normal returns on 
their contributions (Leimer 1994; Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 
1998). Retired Americans continue to receive Medicare benefits that 
are vastly larger than those that could be financed solely out of their 
contributions and the interest earnings on those contributions. This 
fact is well known to students of social insurance, who recognize that 
most early contributors to a pay-as-you-go retirement system obtain 
exceptional returns on their contributions. The exceptional returns on 
Social Security and Medicare taxes, like those on owner-occupied 
homes, have increased the amount of consumption that older Ameri 
cans can afford. One way workers have used these windfall gains is to 
retire at a younger age.
While some researchers have attributed most of the postwar 
decline in male labor force participation to the introduction and liberal 
ization of Social Security, most specialists think the impact on retire 
ment has been considerably smaller. Because of the long-term rise in 
productivity, workers are much wealthier today than they were at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. This would have led workers to 
retire earlier than previous generations, even in the absence of Social 
Security and Medicare. Social Security, Medicare, and employer- 
sponsored retirement plans were established and expanded in part to 
help workers achieve the goal of living comfortably without work in 
old age. If these programs had not be developed, it is likely that work 
ers and employers would have found other ways to achieve the same 
goal.
Of all the explanations advanced for earlier retirement, two of the 
least persuasive are declining health and the changing physical require-
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ments of work. While nearly all good retirement studies find that 
health plays an important role in the timing of retirement, there is no 
convincing evidence that the health of 60-year-olds or 65-year-olds 
was declining over the period in which older Americans' labor force 
participation rates were falling. Declining mortality rates as well as 
recent evidence about the trend in the physical disabilities of the aged 
suggest instead that the health of Americans is improving, at least in 
early old age. Moreover, analyses of the growth of different kinds of 
occupations and in their physical requirements imply that the physical 
demands of work are now easier to meet than they were in the past. A 
much smaller proportion of jobs requires strenuous physical effort; and 
a larger percentage requires only moderate or light physical exertion 
(Manton and Stollard 1994; Baily 1987). Of course, within every gen 
eration there will be workers who are in poor health and who work in 
physically demanding jobs. These workers will be among the first to 
retire. But it seems unlikely that general health deterioration or wide 
spread increases in the physical demands of employment can explain 
the general tendency for recent generations to retire earlier than work 
ers in the past.
Financial Incentives
Besides increasing most current retirees' lifetime wealth, the 
Social Security system also affects the financial attractiveness of 
remaining at work. Most workers can choose to collect Social Security 
starting at age 62, and many do. The effect of Social Security on retire 
ment behavior before age 62 depends on the Social Security tax and on 
the benefit formula that links eventual monthly pensions to a worker's 
past covered earnings. Employers and workers pay a combined tax 
equal to 12.4 percent of wages into the system. The tax thus reduces 
workers' wages by about 12 percent in comparison with the wages they 
would earn if the program did not exist. On the other hand, contribu 
tions allow a worker to earn credits toward a Social Security pension. 
The pension entitlement goes up as the worker's covered lifetime 
wages increase. Whether the increase in the pension entitlement is 
large enough to compensate a worker for his extra contributions is an 
empirical question. Low-wage workers typically receive favorable 
treatment under the Social Security benefit formula, so they often
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receive a generous return on their extra contributions. High-wage 
workers usually receive lower returns. For any worker who is less than 
62 years old, Social Security affects the marginal return from working 
by reducing net current pay by about 12 percent and increasing the 
present value of future Social Security pensions. Whether this 
increases or reduces the willingness of a worker to continue working 
depends on the exact amount of the future pension increase (which 
depends on the worker's expected longevity) and on the worker's feel 
ings about the relative value of current versus future income and the 
attractiveness of immediate retirement.
Starting at age 62, Social Security has a different kind of effect on 
the retirement decision. When a worker delays receipt of retirement 
benefits by working another year after the earliest age of eligibility, two 
things happen, one good and one bad. The bad news is that the worker 
passes up the chance to collect a Social Security check. The good news 
is that future retirement benefits will be higher because average life 
time earnings are recalculated and because the monthly pension check 
is increased for every month of delay in asking for benefits. If a worker 
is entitled to a $500-per-month pension, for example, she sacrifices 
$500 in retirement income every month she postpones retirement past 
age 62. If her regular monthly pay is $10,000, this represents a small 
sacrifice. But if her usual pay is $1,000, the sacrifice amounts to half 
her wage. Between the ages of 62 and 64, the Social Security formula 
offers average workers a fair compensation for giving up a year's bene 
fits. Monthly benefits are adjusted upwards about 8 percent for each 
year's delay in claiming them. For workers with average life expect 
ancy and a moderate rate of time preference, this adjustment is just 
large enough so that the sacrifice of a year's benefits is compensated by 
eligibility for a higher pension in the future. After age 65, however, the 
benefit formula has historically been less generous toward delayed 
retirement. Postponement of retirement after that age was not fairly 
compensated by increases in the monthly pension. For most workers 
this is true even taking account of the fact that the basic pension calcu 
lation gives them extra credit for their most recent wages.3 In essence, 
the Social Security formula forces workers who delay retirement after 
65 to accept a cut in the lifetime value of their Social Security pay 
ments. This is a clear inducement to retire no later than age 65.
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It is worth noting that almost no workers are "average." A benefit 
calculation rule that is age-neutral or actuarially fair on average can 
still provide strong financial incentives to retire for a worker who has 
below-average life expectancy. This worker may not expect to live 
long enough for the future benefit increase to make up for the benefits 
he gives up by delaying retirement for one more year. Similarly, a 
worker who applies a high discount rate when evaluating future bene 
fits may not be impressed that the pension adjustment is "fair" for an 
average worker. For workers who are impatient to consume, an 8-per 
cent hike in benefits starting one year from today may not be enough to 
compensate for the loss of 12 monthly benefit checks over the next 
year. Even an actuarially fair pension adjustment might be insufficient 
to persuade workers who are tired of their jobs to delay retirement.
One reason that many people must retire in order to collect a Social 
Security check is that the program imposes an earnings test in calculat 
ing the annual pension. Workers who are between age 62 and 64 and 
who earn more than $10,800 a year lose $1 in annual benefits for every 
$2 in earnings they receive in excess of $10,800. Until recently, work 
ers between 65 and 69 lost $1 in benefits for every $3 in annual earn 
ings in excess of $17,000. (Pensioners age 70 and older did not face an 
earnings test.) At one time the earnings limits were much lower, dis 
couraging pensioners from work and possibly encouraging them to 
postpone claiming a pension until they were confident their earnings 
would remain low.
Many employer-sponsored pension plans are structured similarly 
to Social Security pensions. Workers who are covered under an old- 
fashioned defined-benefit plan earn pension credits for as long as they 
work for the employer that sponsors the plan (sometimes up to a maxi 
mum number of years). The longer they work under the plan, the 
higher their monthly pension. Most defined-benefit plans are struc 
tured to encourage workers to remain with the employer for a minimal 
period (say, 10 years) or until a critical age (say, age 55). Workers who 
stay for shorter periods may receive very little under the plan. On the 
other hand, workers who stay in the job too long may see the value of 
their pension accumulation shrink. This would happen if the plan 
offered benefits to workers starting at age 55 but then failed to signifi 
cantly increase the monthly benefit for workers who delayed retirement 
after age 55. If a 55-year-old worker can collect a monthly pension of
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$1,000 when he retires immediately and a monthly check of $1,001 if 
he delays his retirement one year, he will clearly lose a substantial 
amount of lifetime benefits nearly $12,000 for each year he post 
pones receipt. The worker essentially suffers a pay cut when he 
reaches age 55, and the cut is equal to the loss in lifetime benefits he 
suffers by postponing retirement. Such a pay cut might seem illegal 
under U.S. age discrimination laws, but it is perfectly legal as long as 
the pay cut is reflected in reduced lifetime pensions rather than reduced 
money wages. Many employers find this kind of pension formula to be 
an effective prod in pushing workers into early retirement.
There is one important difference between Social Security and 
employer-sponsored defined-benefit pensions. Social Security imposes 
an earnings test on income received from all employment, including 
self-employment. Employer-sponsored pensions may impose an even 
tougher earnings test, but the test applies only to earnings received 
from the sponsoring employer or group of employers. Workers who 
wish to claim a pension may be forced to leave the job on which they 
earned the pension, but they are not forced to leave work altogether. 
Nevertheless, the effects of employer-sponsored pensions on retire 
ment may be similar to those of Social Security, because many older 
workers find it hard to get attractive job offers after they have retired 
from their career jobs.
This explanation of the financial incentives in Social Security and 
employer-sponsored pensions sheds some light on the retirement 
trends discussed earlier. Social Security is now the main source of cash 
income of households headed by someone 65 or older. The program 
provides slightly more than 40 percent of the total cash income 
received by the aged. Among aged households in the bottom 60 per 
cent of the elderly income distribution, Social Security provides over 
three-quarters of cash income. Until 1941, Social Security provided no 
income at all to the aged. Today the program replaces about 42 percent 
of the final wage earned by a full-career single worker who earns the 
average wage and claims a pension at age 65. If the worker has a non- 
working dependent spouse, the benefit replaces 63 percent of the 
worker's final wage. Benefits are clearly large enough so they can be 
economically significant in influencing the choice of retirement age.
The distributions of male retirement ages in 1940, 1970, and 1998- 
1999 are plotted in Figure 5. The chart shows the percentage of men
Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible? 391









56 59 62 65 68 71 
Age
1998-1999
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of data in Figure 1.
392 Burtless and Quinn
leaving the labor force at each age from 56 to 72, computed as a frac 
tion of the men in the labor force at age 55.4 The calculations are 
based on the data displayed in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, the retire 
ment-age distributions for 1970, and especially for 1998-1999, are 
skewed toward the left. Labor force withdrawal occurred at earlier 
ages in those years than it did in 1940. Both the 1970 and 1998-1999 
distributions show evidence of clustering in retirement at particular 
ages. In 1970, the peak rate of retirement occurred at age 65; by 1998- 
1999, the peak occurred at age 62. There are peaks in the distribution 
of retirements in 1940 at ages 65 and 70, but these are far lower than 
the peaks in 1970 and 1998-1999, when the timing of retirements was 
influenced by Social Security.
Our description of the financial incentives in Social Security sug 
gests a simple explanation for the clustering of retirements at ages 62 
and 65, at least in years after 1940. Workers who continued to work 
beyond age 65 gave up Social Security benefits for which they were not 
fairly compensated. This feature of the benefit formula clearly encour 
ages retirement at age 65. The clustering of retirements at age 62 can 
be explained using similar logic. Starting in 1961, age 62 became the 
earliest age at which men could claim a Social Security pension. 
Before 1961, there was no evidence of clustering in retirements at age 
62, but by 1970, retirement was more common at 62 than at any other 
age except 65. By the mid 1990s, age 62 was by a wide margin the 
most popular age of retirement. In principle, the Social Security for 
mula fairly compensates "average" workers if they delay claiming a 
pension past age 62. As we have seen, however, a worker with a high 
rate of time preference or short life expectancy might not regard the 
compensation as fair. In that case, we should expect many workers to 
prefer retiring at age 62 rather than a later age.
Of course, the clustering of retirements at ages 62 and 65 may be 
due to factors other than Social Security. It is hard to believe, however, 
that health or work opportunities decline abruptly at particular ages. 
Another explanation is that some workers were affected by mandatory 
retirement rules. This explanation may have been valid in 1940 and 
1970, when mandatory retirement rules covered up to one-half of 
American workers, but it is not persuasive today. Amendments to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act passed in 1986 prohibit 
employers from dismissing workers solely on account of their age.
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The simplest alternative explanation for the clustering of retire 
ment ages is that workers are affected by employer-sponsored pension 
plans, yet many older workers are not covered by an employer plan. 
The Current Population Surveys suggest that employer-sponsored pen 
sions do not provide a large percentage of income to older Americans 
except in more affluent households. But, for those workers who are 
covered by a private pension plan, the financial incentives in the plan 
may provide powerful incentives for workers to leave their career jobs 
at a particular age.
Health Insurance
Unlike most other industrialized countries, the United States does 
not provide universal health insurance to its citizens. Instead, most 
working-age Americans receive health insurance coverage as part of an 
employer's compensation package. In 1995, 72 percent of American 
workers between 18 and 64 had health insurance coverage under an 
employer-based plan, either through their own employer or through the 
employer of another family member. Some workers obtain insurance 
through publicly provided Medicaid or privately purchased health 
plans, but 18 percent of American workers were left uninsured. Some 
employers offer continuing health insurance to their workers, even 
after they leave the firm. In 1995, of those full-time employees in 
medium and large firms who had health insurance on their jobs, 46 per 
cent also had retiree health coverage before age 65, and 41 percent had 
retiree coverage at ages 65 and older. The percentage of the labor force 
employed by firms offering such protection is shrinking, and many 
employers now require their retired workers to pay for more of the cost 
of the plans (EBRI 1997a).
The nation's peculiar health insurance system provides a compli 
cated set of incentives for retirement. Health insurance is particularly 
important for workers who are past middle age but not yet eligible for 
Medicare, because many of them face high risk of incurring heavy 
medical expenses. Workers with health insurance on the job who 
would lose it if they retire have an obvious incentive to remain on the 
job, at least until age 65 when they become eligible for Medicare. 
Those with postretirement health benefits have less incentive to remain
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employed, although how much less depends on how the insurance 
costs after retirement are shared between the employee and employer.
As with Social Security and private pensions, there is considerable 
evidence that health insurance coverage before and after retirement has 
an important influence on individual retirement decisions. Gustman 
and Steinmeier found, for example, that the effects of insurance plans 
are similar in nature to those of employer-sponsored pension plans 
(Gustman and Steinmeier 1994). If workers can become eligible for 
retiree health benefits only after a delay, the availability of the plan 
tends to delay workers' retirements until they gain eligibility. After eli 
gibility has been achieved, the availability of retiree health benefits 
encourages earlier retirement than would occur if no benefits were 
offered. Quinn estimated that men and women in career jobs in 1992 
were 8 to 10 percentage points less likely to leave their jobs over the 
next four years if they would lose health insurance coverage by doing 
so (Quinn 1999a). Inferring the overall effect of health insurance 
incentives on retirement patterns is tricky, however. A number of com 
ponents of employee compensation, including wage rates, pension cov 
erage, health insurance, and retiree health benefits tend to be highly 
correlated with one another. This makes it difficult to distinguish sta 
tistically between the separate effects of each component of compensa 
tion. Nonetheless, the rising importance of health insurance coverage 
to older Americans suggests that the evolution of the public and private 
health insurance system may have had a sizable impact on retirement 
patterns.
The Change in Retirement Trends after 1985
There are two types of explanation for the slowdown or reversal of 
retirement trends in recent years. One hypothesis is that permanent 
changes in the environment for retirees have encouraged additional 
work by older Americans. Under this conjecture, the long-term trend 
toward earlier retirement is over. Another view is that temporary cycli 
cal factors are responsible for a pause in the historical retirement trend. 
When these cyclical factors are behind us, the historical trend toward 
earlier retirement will resume. Although it will be many years before 
we can be sure of the relative importance of these explanations, it is
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possible to assess some of the permanent and temporary factors that 
have influenced recent retirement trends.
The most important cyclical factor affecting retirement is the state 
of the economy. The American economy is currently growing strongly, 
and the unemployment rate is near a 30-year low. The second half of 
the 1980s and the 1990s saw lengthy economic expansions and strong 
employment growth. There was only one recession after 1985. These 
factors made it easier for workers to find jobs when they were dis 
missed and more likely to find the terms and conditions of employment 
that they desire. In contrast, economic growth was much lower even in 
the 15 years after 1970. That period saw three recessions, and two of 
those recessions in 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 were the worst of 
the postwar era. Weak labor demand discourages jobless workers from 
persisting in their job search. Strong demand creates employment 
options for older workers who want to keep working.
Although we think a strong economy has contributed to the recent 
rise in older Americans' participation rates, it is probably not a big part 
of the story. The economy also grew strongly and unemployment 
reached very low levels in the 1960s, yet older men's labor force partic 
ipation rates fell in the decade and older women's participation rates 
changed very little (see Table 1). In earlier work, Quinn estimated the 
impact of the business cycle on older workers' participation rates and 
found that changes in the overall unemployment rate account for a rel 
atively small proportion of the change in participation trends since 
1985 (Quinn 1999b). Most of the change in participation trends since 
1985 is probably due to factors other than the cyclical movement in 
economy-wide unemployment.
It is easier to point to factors that have permanently changed in a 
way that encourages later withdrawal from the job market. One impor 
tant change is that the nation's main pension program, Social Security, 
is no longer growing more generous. Workers who retired between 
1950 and 1980 retired in an environment in which Social Security ben 
efits were rising, both absolutely and in relation to the average earnings 
of typical American workers. Most workers received pensions that 
were higher than those they would have obtained if their Social Secu 
rity contributions had been invested in safe assets. The maturation of 
the Social Security program meant that fewer workers who retired after 
1985 received windfalls from the program. The Social Security
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amendments of 1977 and 1983 brought an end to a four-decade expan 
sion and liberalization of benefits. In fact, the amendments trimmed 
retirement benefits modestly in order to keep the program solvent.
Congress has changed Social Security rules and the pension for 
mula to make work late in life more attractive. The amount of income 
a recipient can earn without losing any Social Security benefits has 
been increased, and the benefit loss for each dollar earned over the 
exempt amount was reduced (from 50 to 33 cents) for pensioners 
between 65 and 69. In 2000, the earnings test was eliminated alto 
gether for workers aged 65 and older. In the 1977 and 1983 Social 
Security amendments, Congress also increased the reward that workers 
receive for delaying initial benefit receipt past the normal retirement 
age (NRA). Instead of penalizing work after the NRA, Social Security 
is becoming more age-neutral. When this formula change is fully 
implemented, for workers attaining age 62 after 2004, the adjustment 
for delayed benefit receipt will be approximately fair for retirements up 
through age 70. It is nearly so today. There will be no financial pen 
alty for delaying retirement beyond the normal retirement age.
Important changes have also occurred in the private sector. There 
has been a sharp increase in the relative importance of defined-contri- 
bution pension plans and a continuing decline in the importance of 
defined-benefit plans. Defined-contribution plans are age-neutral by 
design, and therefore they have none of the age-specific work disincen 
tives that are common in traditional defined-benefit plans. As a grow 
ing percentage of workers reaches retirement age under defined- 
contribution plans, there will be less reason for workers to leave their 
jobs to avoid a loss in lifetime retirement benefits.
Some changes in the environment for retirees are the result of pol 
icy initiatives aimed specifically at encouraging more work at older 
ages. For example, mandatory retirement has been nearly eliminated 
in the United States. In the early 1970s, about half of all American 
workers were covered by mandatory retirement provisions that 
required them to leave their jobs no later than a particular age, usually 
age 65. In 1978, the earliest legal age of mandatory retirement was 
raised from 65 to 70, and in 1986, mandatory retirement provisions 
were outlawed altogether for the vast majority of workers. The 
increase and eventual elimination of mandatory retirement ages not 
only increased the options open to older employees who wanted to
Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible? 397
remain on their jobs, but also sent an important message to Americans 
about the appropriate age to retire.
This message was reinforced by a provision of the 1983 Social 
Security amendments that is gradually raising the normal retirement 
age in Social Security from 65 to 67. The higher NRA will become 
fully effective for workers who reach age 62 in 2022. So far as we 
know, the United States was the first industrial nation to pass a law lift 
ing the retirement age under its main public pension program. 
Although few workers may be aware of the higher retirement age, 
many are affected by it already. Workers reaching age 62 in 2000 face 
a normal retirement age of 65 years and 2 months, which means that 
they will qualify for age-62 pensions that are 1 percent smaller than 
age-62 benefits under the traditional NRA. The delay in the eligibility 
age for unreduced pensions has an effect on benefit levels that is almost 
identical to across-the-board benefit cuts.
These changes suggest that the future will not look like the past. 
The relative attractiveness of work and retirement at older ages has 
been altered in favor of work, though the changes may have produced 
only modest effects so far. The break in the early retirement trend that 
occurred in the mid 1980s suggests that changes in the retirement envi 
ronment are having an impact in the expected direction.
SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?
Even if the trend toward earlier retirement has stopped or reversed, 
it is natural to ask whether the nation should take additional steps to 
encourage later retirement. One reason for doing so is concern over 
public finances. Social Security is the largest item in the federal bud 
get. In 1995, Social Security outlays represented 4.6 percent of GDP 
and a little less than 22 percent of overall federal spending. After the 
income tax, the program is the most important source of federal tax 
revenues. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the financial outlook for Social 
Security is relatively secure, even under pessimistic assumptions about 
the state of the economy. When the baby-boom generation reaches 
retirement age in the second decade of the century, however, benefit 
payments will begin to climb much faster than tax revenue. Outlays
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will exceed taxes and will eventually exceed tax revenues plus interest 
payments earned by the trust funds. Under the intermediate assump 
tions of the Social Security Trustees, the trust funds will begin to 
shrink. Unless benefits are trimmed or tax rates increased, the trust 
funds will eventually fall to zero, making it impossible under current 
law to make timely benefit payments. The financial condition of the 
Medicare program is more perilous than that of Social Security. The 
reserves of the system are smaller, and they will be depleted much 
sooner than the OASDI trust funds.
Restoring both Medicare and Social Security to long-term sol 
vency will be costly. The federal budgetary cost of achieving solvency 
would obviously be smaller if workers' eligibility for benefits under 
the two programs were delayed. In the remainder of this chapter, we 
focus on options to encourage later retirement under the Social Secu 
rity program.
The solvency of Social Security, like that of any pension program, 
depends on four crucial elements: 1) the contribution rate imposed on 
workers and their employers; 2) the pension fund's rate of return on its 
investments; 3) the age of eligibility for pensions; and 4) the average 
monthly pension paid to retirees. The first two elements determine the 
annual amount of funds flowing into the system, and the last two deter 
mine the annual amount flowing out of the system. Each of the four 
elements must be carefully calibrated to ensure that benefit promises 
are matched by expected future revenues. If a pension program is 
exactly solvent and one of the four elements changes, some adjustment 
in the other three elements may be necessary to restore the solvency of 
the program. For example, if the rate of return on pension fund invest 
ments falls, it will be necessary to increase the contribution rate, delay 
the age of eligibility for pensions, or lower monthly pensions in order 
to restore the pension program to solvency.
Improvements in life expectancy increase the funding requirements 
of a pension plan. If contributors live one additional year in retirement, 
the plan must find enough extra resources to finance the added benefit 
payments. To keep the pension system solvent, this requires higher 
contributions to the program, a higher rate of return on investments, a 
delay in the retirement age, or a reduction in monthly benefits. It is 
worth emphasizing that this is true for every type of pension plan, 
whether public or private. If Social Security had never been estab-
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lished, increases in American life spans over the past half century 
would have required private pension plans to increase their contribu 
tion rates, find investments that yield higher rates of return, delay the 
age of eligibility for pensions, or reduce monthly pension payments.
A large part of Social Security's long-term funding problem arises 
because of good news about longevity. 5 Americans now live longer 
than their parents and grandparents did. Their children and grandchil 
dren can be expected to live longer than we do. The improvements in 
longevity mean that living Americans will survive much longer past 
age 65 than was true when Social Security was established in the Great 
Depression. The longevity increases provide the equivalent of a benefit 
increase to Social Security recipients. The benefit increase must be 
paid for if the system is to remain solvent.
Political Unpopularity
While it might seem logical to raise the retirement age in Social 
Security to reflect improvements in longevity, that logic has so far 
escaped the general public. American voters and workers routinely 
reject the idea of a higher retirement age when it is suggested as a solu 
tion to Social Security's problems. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Sha- 
piro recently summarized the findings of 18 polls that asked Americans 
about their attitudes toward an increase in the retirement age (Jacobs 
and Shapiro 1998, pp. 381-384). The polls were conducted over a 20- 
year period ending in 1997, and each poll was administered to at least 
750 respondents. With rare exceptions, solid majorities of respondents 
reject any proposed hike in the retirement age. The size of the majority 
opposing a higher retirement age was higher in the 1990s than it was in 
the 1980s. Political leaders apparently take their cue from the polling 
numbers. Nearly all of the presidential candidates in both political par 
ties have expressed strong opposition to the idea of a higher Social 
Security retirement age. 6
Americans' hostility to a higher retirement age does not provide 
much guidance to policymakers, however. Solid majorities also 
oppose other basic steps that would solve Social Security's long-term 
funding problem. Most poll respondents are against higher payroll 
taxes, lower monthly benefits, and investment of Social Security 
reserves in stocks, where they would earn a higher return (Jacobs and
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Shapiro 1998; EBRI 1997c, p. 11). Many workers may oppose a 
higher retirement age in Social Security because they intend, or at least 
hope, to retire several years before attaining the early eligibility age for 
Social Security benefits. When asked in an EBRI poll when they hope 
to start retirement, one-third of active workers answered "age 55 or 
younger." When asked when they actually expect to retire, however, 
only 15 percent thought their retirements would occur before age 56 
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 1). If the Social Security retirement age were 
increased, early retirement would become a less affordable dream.
Other Options
There is no compelling reason to raise either the Social Security 
retirement age or the average retirement age, of course. If Americans' 
incomes continue to grow 1 or 2 percent a year, some fraction of the 
increase can be used to finance comfortable incomes during longer 
spells of retirement. This means, however, that more of the income 
earned by active workers must be set aside to pay for longer retire 
ments. This could take the form of higher payroll or income taxes to 
pay for Social Security benefits to the currently retired or higher per 
sonal saving to make up for the loss of monthly Social Security bene 
fits if Social Security pensions are trimmed to preserve solvency. 
There is some evidence that workers understand this trade-off. When 
forced to choose between the option of making larger contributions to 
pay for retirement or accepting smaller pensions after they retire, most 
workers opt to make larger contributions. By a 2-to-l majority, work 
ers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pensions 
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 6). This suggests a simple conclusion: Americans 
would rather set aside more of their wages for retirement than postpone 
their retirement.
Workers can offset the effect of higher retirement contributions by 
working longer hours during their prime working years. There is some 
evidence this is occurring. American work patterns have changed 
slowly but significantly over the past generation. Since the 1960s, 
three major trends have affected adults' use of time. Women have 
joined the paid workforce in record numbers; men have retired from 
their jobs at younger ages; and both men and women have devoted 
more years to formal schooling. The effects of these trends on average
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work effort can be seen in Figure 6, which shows changes in weekly 
hours of paid work between 1968 and 1998. The weekly average is 
calculated as the total hours of work during the survey week divided by 
the total number of men and women in the indicated age group. People 
who do not work are included in these estimates. (The estimates would 
show higher average hours if they reflected the work effort only of peo 
ple who held jobs.)
In spite of the trend toward earlier male retirement since 1968, the 
figure shows a sizable jump in the total amount of time that Americans 
spend at work. The increase in hours was driven almost entirely by the 
surge in women's employment. The CPS interviews show only a small 
change in average weekly hours among men and women who actually 
hold a job. Averaging across all ages, women worked 49 percent more 
hours in March 1998 than they did in March 1968 (20.3 hours a week 
in 1968 versus 13.6 hours in 1968). The rise was due to a 45 percent 
jump in the fraction of women holding jobs. Partly offsetting the rise 
in women's employment was the dip in men's paid work. Most of the
Figure 6 Average Hours of Work by Age Group in the U.S. Population, 
1968 and 1998





SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of March 1968 and March 1998 Current Population 
Survey files.
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drop occurred as a result of decreasing employment among men past 
age 54. Across all age groups, the male employment rate fell 6 per 
centage points (or 8 percent) between 1968 and 1998, but it fell 15 per 
centage points among men between 55 and 64 and 9 points among men 
past 64.
The combined effects of the shifts in male and female work pat 
terns are displayed Figure 6. Averaging the trends of both men and 
women, we see that hours spent on the job increased for people 18 to 
54 years old and declined for people past age 54. Older Americans 
clearly enjoyed more free time in 1998 than did their counterparts in 
1968, mainly because of earlier male retirement. For adults between 
25 and 54, however, the estimates imply that paid employment con 
sumes a much bigger percentage of available time. The employment 
rate of people in their prime working years jumped 11 percentage 
points (almost 17 percent) between March 1968 and March 1998, 
boosting the average amount of time spent in jobs from 28 hours to 32 
hours a week. This increase is equivalent to five extra 40-hour work 
weeks a year for adults between 25 and 54. In short, Americans are 
working longer hours between 25 and 54. The increase in hours should 
help them pay for shorter hours and longer retirements when they are 
older than 55.
HOW COULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?
Assuming that it is desirable to do so, how might we encourage 
American workers to delay their retirements further? In this section we 
consider some alternatives and discuss their likely impact on future 
trends in the average retirement age.
Changing the Incentives in Social Security
Since the eligibility age for pensions is one of the main features of 
Social Security affecting its solvency, it is sensible to consider adjust 
ments in the eligibility age to help restore the system's financing. One 
possibility is to accelerate the increase in the normal retirement age 
already scheduled under present law. Instead of phasing in the increase
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over 23 years (with a 12-year hiatus between the change from 65 to 66 
and the change from 66 to 67), Congress could phase in the NRA 
change over just 12 years. This would mean that the higher NRA will 
be fully implemented for workers reaching age 62 in 2011, rather than 
2022.
A second possibility is to increase the NRA automatically in line 
with increases in life expectancy after 65. A majority of members of 
the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council proposed increasing 
the NRA as necessary after 2011 to maintain a constant ratio of retire 
ment years to potential years of work. Retirement years is defined as 
life expectancy at the NRA, and potential years of work as the number 
of years from age 20 to the NRA. Under the Social Security Trustees' 
intermediate assumptions, this proposal would push up the NRA to age 
70 by about 2080. The Social Security Actuary estimates that the com 
bination of accelerating the NRA increase and then increasing the 
NRA in line with longevity improvements eliminates nearly one-quar 
ter of Social Security's long-term funding gap.
Lifting the NRA while leaving the early eligibility age (EEA) 
unchanged produces almost exactly the same effect on retired workers' 
Social Security benefits as a proportional reduction in the full pension 
(usually referred to as the "primary insurance amount," or PIA). Even 
though most people describe an increase in the normal retirement age 
as a "delay" in the retirement age, it is in fact closer to a reduction in 
the monthly benefit amount. Workers can still obtain pensions at the 
same age as before, but their monthly pensions are smaller, no matter 
what age they choose.
There are some important non-economic differences between rais 
ing the NRA and cutting the full Social Security pension, however. 
First, increasing the NRA signals to workers that the same monthly 
benefit can be obtained by postponing retirement, which may encour 
age some workers to delay retirement rather than accept a lower pen 
sion. Sponsors of employer pension plans might also be induced to 
modify their plans to encourage delayed pension acceptance if the 
Social Security NRA were increased. Second, in light of the well- 
known improvements in life expectancy, American workers might find 
increases in the retirement age to be more understandable and fairer 
than equivalent reductions in full pensions. By increasing the retire 
ment age rather than reducing full pensions, Congress conveys the
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message that the benefit level is appropriate, but the timing is not  
workers ought to postpone their retirements.
Congress might increase the early eligibility age (EEA) at the same 
time and at the same pace as it increases the NRA. An increase in the 
EEA is fundamentally different from an increase in the NRA. If the 
EEA is increased above age 62, 62-year-old workers will be prevented 
from obtaining old-age pensions. Under current law they can collect 
reduced old-age pensions or they can apply for Disability Insurance 
(DI) pensions. When the possibility of obtaining old-age pensions is 
eliminated, some 62-year-olds who otherwise would have received old- 
age pensions will apply for DI. This will increase Social Security 
administrative costs, because eligibility is much more expensive to 
determine in the DI program. It may also impose serious hardship on 
workers whose DI applications are denied.
These consequences of increasing the early eligibility age make 
many people reluctant to tamper with it. Many policymakers are more 
uneasy about a reform that denies benefits completely to an identifiable 
class of people than they are about one that reduces benefits modestly 
to a much wider population. It is important to recognize why Social 
Security has an early eligibility age, however. If workers could apply 
for benefits as soon as they accumulated enough earnings credits, some 
low-income workers would be tempted to apply for benefits in their 
late fifties or even their late forties. At such ages, however, their 
monthly benefits would be very low, because early pensions are 
reduced below the full pension in proportion to the number of months 
between the age a worker claims benefits and the NRA. The low level 
of the initial pension might not represent a problem for a worker who is 
50 or 60 years old and can supplement monthly pensions with modest 
wages or an employer-sponsored pension. But, it could cause serious 
hardship when a worker reaches age 68 or 70 and finds she is no longer 
able to work and the company pension no longer covers the cost of gro 
ceries and the monthly rent. The existence of the early entitlement age 
prevents short-sighted workers from applying for pensions that will be 
too small to support them throughout a long retirement.
When the NRA eventually reaches 67, workers claiming early pen 
sions at age 62 will receive 70 percent of a full pension, a 30 percent 
reduction below the full pension rather than the current 20 percent 
reduction. If the NRA were eventually increased to 70 and the early
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eligibility age remained unchanged, workers claiming pensions at age 
62 would receive monthly benefits as low as 52 percent of a full pen 
sion probably too little to live on for a low-wage worker with few 
other sources of income. If the NRA is increased above 67, it seems 
sensible to increase the early eligibility age as well. Since Social Secu 
rity is intended to assure a basic floor of support for retired Americans, 
it seems perverse to allow full-career workers to claim benefits so early 
that their monthly benefit will be too low to live on. This implies that 
the early eligibility age must eventually be raised above 62 if the NRA 
rises much above age 67. In order to implement this reform in a 
humane way, Congress might consider liberalizing eligibility require 
ments for Disability Insurance benefits starting at age 62. People who 
have worked in physically demanding occupations and are in impaired 
health could be given access to benefits that permit them to retire with 
a decent standard of living, even if they do not meet the strict standard 
for health impairment that is used to evaluate DI applications today.
Effects of Changing the NRA and EEA on 
Actual Retirement Ages
It is natural to ask whether increasing the early and normal retire 
ment ages would have much effect on when workers actually retire. 
Almost all researchers who have examined this question agree that 
such reforms would tend to increase the average age at retirement, 
though the effect may not be large. This conclusion was reached in a 
great majority of economists' studies conducted in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Most studies found that even large changes in Social Security 
would cause only small changes in the average retirement age. Burt- 
less and Moffitt (1985) estimated, for example, that increasing the nor 
mal retirement age in Social Security from 65 to 68 would add only a 
little more than four months to the full-time working careers of men 
who have no disabilities.7
One way to assess the impact of Social Security reforms is to 
examine differences in retirement patterns among people who face dif 
ferent incentives because the program has been changed in an unantici 
pated way. In 1969 and again in 1972, Social Security benefits were 
increased much faster relative to wages than at any time in the recent 
past. By 1973, benefits were 20 percent higher than would have been
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the case if pensions had grown with wages as they did during the 1950s 
and 1960s. In 1977, Congress passed amendments to the Social Secu 
rity Act sharply reducing benefits to workers born in 1917 and later 
years (the "notch" generation) in comparison with the benefits avail 
able to workers born before 1917.
Burtless (1986) studied the first episode, and Krueger and Pischke 
(1992) examined the second. Both studies reached an identical conclu 
sion: major changes in Social Security generosity produced small ini 
tial effects on the retirement behavior and labor force participation of 
older men. Burtless found, for example, that the 20 percent benefit 
hike between 1969 and 1973 caused only a two-month reduction in 
average retirement age of men who were fully covered by the more 
generous formula. This is equivalent to a reduction in the labor force 
participation rates of 62-year-old and 65-year-old men of less than 2 
percentage points. The effects of the 1977 amendments found by Krue 
ger and Pischke were even smaller.
These findings suggest that an increase in the normal retirement 
age will probably have only a small effect on the age that male workers 
withdraw from the workforce. It is harder to predict the effects of an 
increase in the early retirement age because we do not have good 
enough historical evidence to evaluate the impact of this kind of 
change. When the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security retire 
ment benefits was decreased from 65 to 62 (in 1956 for women and in 
1961 for men), labor force participation rates fell significantly and 
much faster than they had previously. The reversal of this policy would 
likely have a larger impact than the change in the normal retirement 
age, especially for low wage workers who have no other sources of 
retirement income except Social Security. The magnitude of the 
increased labor force participation would depend, in part, on how 
employer pensions responded to the change in Social Security rules 
and the extent to which eligibility criteria for DI benefits were loos 
ened.
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EMPLOYER RESPONSES
Some people wonder how employers would respond to changes in 
the early and normal retirement ages in Social Security. Would firms 
with defined-benefit pension plans increase their early retirement 
incentives to offset the loss of the Social Security incentives or to make 
their plans more age-neutral? If workers wanted to delay their retire 
ments to become eligible for more generous Social Security pensions, 
could the economy create enough extra jobs to employ them? Would 
employers discriminate against older job seekers, making it hard for 
them to find and keep jobs?
Historical evidence about the job-creating capacity of the U.S. 
market is reassuring. Over the long run, the U.S. labor market seems 
capable of absorbing large numbers of extra workers without a signifi 
cant rise in joblessness. From 1964 through 1989, when the baby- 
boom generation reached adulthood and entered the job market, the 
labor force grew by 50.4 million persons, or slightly more than 2 mil 
lion new entrants a year. Most of this surge was driven by the jump in 
U.S. fertility between 1946 and 1964, but part was also due to a grow 
ing demand for employment by women, who entered the workforce in 
record numbers. From 1964 to 1989, the number of Americans holding 
jobs climbed by 47.7 million, or slightly more than 1.9 million workers 
a year. In other words, about 95 percent of new job seekers in the 
period were able to find jobs, though the number of people available 
for work swelled by two-thirds. The unemployment rate rose only 
slightly, increasing from 5.0 percent to 5.2 percent.
Many people find it surprising that so many extra job seekers can 
be absorbed by the labor market. They overlook a basic reality of flex 
ible labor markets like those in the United States. In the long run, 
employers are free to change their product lines and production meth 
ods to exploit the availability of a newly abundant type of labor, and 
they can adjust relative wages in response to the entry and exit of dif 
ferent classes of workers.
In the 1970s, for example, the wages received by younger workers 
fell in comparison with those earned by older workers, in large mea 
sure because younger workers became much more abundant. Faced 
with a huge increase in the availability of workers who had limited job
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experience, employers adopted production methods that took advan 
tage of less experienced workers. Restaurant meals were prepared and 
served by eleventh-grade students and high school dropouts rather than 
by experienced cooks or waiters. Gardening and domestic cleaning 
were performed by unskilled and semiskilled employees rather than by 
homeowners themselves. In the end, 95 percent of new job seekers 
were successful in finding jobs. Of course, many of the new jobs were 
not particularly well paid. The huge increase in the abundance of less- 
experienced workers is one reason that pay in many jobs fell.
If older workers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for 
full Social Security retirement benefits to begin, many would choose to 
remain in their career jobs for a few months or years longer than work 
ers presently do. Older workers who lose their jobs would try harder 
and more persistently to find new jobs. The jobs that many would find 
would pay lower wages than the jobs they previously held, as is the 
case for most workers who leave career jobs today. The availability of 
increased numbers of older workers would almost certainly depress the 
relative wages of aged job seekers. Yet, low U.S. fertility means the 
future labor force will grow slowly, placing some pressure on employ 
ers to retain older workers and make jobs attractive to older job-seek 
ers.
Although some observers are pessimistic about the willingness of 
employers to accommodate the special needs of an aged workforce, 
such pessimism seems misplaced. Employers have created millions of 
part-time jobs to accommodate the needs of students and mothers who 
are only available to work short weekly hours. People who work on 
part-time schedules pay a price for short hours in terms of low weekly 
earnings and lost fringe benefits, but they accept these jobs nonethe 
less. Comparable accommodations could be made for the special 
needs of older workers. Many older workers who want jobs to tide 
them over between the time their career jobs end and eligibility for full 
Social Security pensions will be able to find suitable employment.
Other Policies
As noted above, Social Security rules are moving toward age-neu 
trality. Employer pension coverage is shifting toward defined-contri- 
bution plans, which have none of the age-specific retirement incentives
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present in traditional defined-benefit plans. Mandatory retirement has 
been eliminated for the vast majority of American workers, and equal 
employment opportunity laws forbid employment discrimination based 
on age. Federal policies have been enlightened in these areas and are 
partly responsible for the changes in men's and women's retirement 
patterns over the past 15 years. Are there other policies that would 
improve the employment prospects of older Americans? Several come 
to mind:
  Permit workers aged 65 or older to opt out of additional Social 
Security contributions. If this option were chosen, workers 
would also forego the increases in future benefits that these earn 
ings would have caused. A variant of the same idea would be to 
exempt earnings up to some dollar limit from F.I.C.A contribu 
tions as well as Social Security benefit recalculation. This would 
lower employers' cost of hiring older workers, because their pay 
roll tax liabilities would fall, and it would make older workers rel 
atively more attractive to hire and retain. It would also require 
Congress to find a source of revenue to make up for payroll taxes 
lost as a result of the reform.
  Allow employers to offer prorated fringe benefits for employees 
working less than full-time hours, rather than requiring them to 
provide the same fringe benefits to all employees working more 
than 1,000 hours per year (as the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, or ERISA, currently mandates). The present law 
encourages employers to restrict the hours worked by part-time 
employees to fewer than 1,000 per year. Giving employers more 
flexibility would allow older employees and employers to work 
out mutually agreeable fringe benefit packages that might keep 
more older workers employed.
  Make Medicare the first source of health insurance coverage for 
workers over age 65. Current law requires that the employer's 
health plan serve as "first payer" for a worker who has dual insur 
ance coverage. Employers could provide additional insurance 
coverage if they chose. The reform would lower employers' cost 
of hiring or retaining older workers. Of course, it would also 
increase Medicare outlays, which in turn would require lawmak 
ers to find additional sources of revenue for that program.
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  Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to include workers aged 65 
and older who have no dependent children. This would provide a 
federal earnings subsidy to aged low-wage workers who are cur 
rently ineligible for the credit, and it could boost the available 
supply of older workers.
  Repeal the earnings test to eliminate the perception that pension 
ers who continue to work after age 62 lose Social Security bene 
fits by doing so. It is true that workers do lose benefits during any 
year in which their earnings exceed the exempt amount. But for 
the average worker, the actuarial adjustment before age 65 returns 
all or most of the foregone pensions through higher future bene 
fits. Of course, most workers are not average, and those who 
anticipate shorter than average life expectancies or who have high 
discount rates will still find the earnings test a disincentive to 
work Even for average workers the existing test can act as a work 
disincentive. Most Social Security recipients seem unaware of 
the benefit adjustment, so the current earnings test discourages 
them from earning more than the exempt amount. The repeal of 
the earnings test would probably increase recipients' earnings 
modestly, and the long-term budgetary cost would be negligible.
In an economy as strong as the one we have enjoyed over the past 
five years, none of these reforms may be needed to encourage higher 
employment among the aged. But if voters and policymakers want to 
provide incentives that will delay workers' exit from the labor force or 
change employers' attitudes toward older job applicants, some or all 
the reforms could be helpful.
CONCLUSION
After a long period of decline, the trend toward earlier retirement 
came to at least a temporary halt in the mid 1980s. The labor force par 
ticipation rates of American men past age 60 leveled off, and in the past 
few years they have actually increased slightly. Participation rates 
among older women have risen significantly since 1985, though this 
trend may be the result of the historic shift in women's attitudes toward
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career employment rather than to a change in their retirement behavior 
per se. Along with workers in Japan and Scandinavia, Americans now 
leave the paid workforce later than workers anywhere else in the indus 
trialized world.
The question is, do Americans retire at an age that will ultimately 
prove unaffordable? As life spans increase, the fraction of life spent in 
retirement will rise unless we delay our exit from paid work. Improved 
longevity places heavier burdens on active workers if retirees are sup 
ported by contributions from current payrolls. Even without any fur 
ther improvement in longevity, the long-term decline in birth rates has 
slowed labor force growth and will eventually increase the ratio of 
retired to active workers. This will place extra pressure on retirement 
programs like Social Security and Medicare that depend on payroll 
taxes for most of their funding. To reduce this pressure, the country 
could adjust the age of eligibility for early and/or normal retirement 
benefits and take other measures to encourage workers to postpone 
their exit from the labor market. These steps would directly improve 
the finances of Social Security and Medicare. They would encourage 
some workers to delay their departure from career jobs and induce oth 
ers to find bridge jobs to tide them over until full retirement benefits 
begin. The United States has already taken several steps in this direc 
tion, and these steps have contributed to the recent growth of employ 
ment among older Americans.
Although most workers today claim that they expect to keep work 
ing after age 65, or after "retirement," most oppose additional changes 
in the retirement system that would push them to retire at a later age. A 
majority resists the idea that a higher retirement age is needed to pro 
tect Social Security. The United States is a rich country and will 
become wealthier in the future. It can certainly afford to maintain cur 
rent retirement patterns if its citizens choose to spend their additional 
wealth in this way. The important public policy issue is the importance 
of this goal in comparison with other legitimate uses of the rise in 
wealth.
Proponents of a higher retirement age often focus on the long-term 
trend in older people's employment rates without considering what has 
happened to work effort and productivity among people before they 
reach the retirement age. They worry about the budget cost of retire 
ment at age 62 without reflecting on the fact that younger workers may
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be paying for their longer and healthier retirements by working harder 
and more productively in their preretirement careers. As long as pro 
ductivity continues to improve, American society and individual work 
ers can choose how they want to allocate the income gains that flow 
from higher productivity. The evidence of the twentieth century sug 
gests they will use at least part of it to pay for a longer retirement.
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1 Retirement patterns were much more difficult to measure among women because 
most worked primarily within the home (and without pay) during most of their 
adult lives.
2. Labor force participation rates for 1910,1940, and 1970 are based on responses to 
employment questions in the decennial censuses. See Ransom et al. (1991), espe 
cially pages 45-46, and Munnell (1977), page 70. Rates for 1984-85 and 1998- 
99 are the arithmetic average participation rates on the March Current Population 
Survey (CPS) files for 1984, 1985, 1998, and 1999. Participation rates measured 
on the Census differ somewhat from those measured by the CPS, partly because 
the main goal of the CPS is to obtain reliable labor force statistics. Adjusting the 
decennial Census statistics to make them strictly comparable to the CPS estimates 
would have only a slight effect on the patterns displayed in Figure 1, however.
3. Before their 62nd birthdays, workers who contnbute to Social Security for an 
additional year obtain better future pensions because the basic pension formula is 
based on workers' average lifetime wages. Between ages 62 and 64 workers who 
contribute to Social Security obtain that benefit enhancement plus an actuarial 
increase equal to about 8 percent of the basic pension to compensate them for giv 
ing up one year's benefit payments.
4. If the labor force participation rate at age 63 is designated LFPR63, the retirement 
rate at age 63 is calculated as (LFPR^ - LFPR^) + LFPR55- This calculation 
ignores the complications involved in computing true cohort distributions and the 
effects of mortality rates, immigration, and temporary withdrawal from the labor 
force. It offers a picture of the timing of labor market withdrawal based on the 
participation choices of men aged 55 through 72 in a particular year.
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5 Much of the future funding problem is due to the maturation of the program (most 
future retirees will reach the retirement age with enough earnings credits to 
receive a full pension), slow growth in the future working population, and a long- 
term slowdown in the rate of real wage growth (which has deprived the system of 
anticipated revenues). Increased longevity explains only part of the system's 
funding shortfall.
6. In the GOP presidential candidates' debate in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 
December 5, 1999, Steve Forbes, Senator John McCain, and Governor George W. 
Bush all expressed views on increasing the retirement age Forbes described the 
idea as a "betrayal": "that's not fair to the people. They were made a promise and 
it should be kept." McCain said that a retirement age increase was unnecessary. 
Governor Bush flatly ruled out the possibility he would ask for a retirement-age 
increase for people already near retirement, and he expressed "hope" such a step 
would not be needed for younger workers. The Democratic presidential candi 
dates have been equally vehement in their opposition When asked by Tim Rus 
sell whether he supported or opposed hiking the retirement age, Vice President 
Gore responded "Tim, I strongly oppose raising the retirement age." When Gore 
posed the same question to Bill Bradley, Bradley responded "We said no. We said 
no.... OK?" (Meet the Press, December 19, 1999)
7. Other economists' predictions are discussed in Joseph Quinn et al. (1990).
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